

# TEEProtect: Securing the Interface of Enclaves

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
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# Introduction


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- ❑ A **secure enclave** provides CPU hardware-level isolation and memory encryption.  
Applications run in an environment is completely isolated from anything else on the machine, including the OS.
  - ❑ But they do rely on OS services to function (filesystem, synchronization etc.)
- ❑ An untrusted OS can perform **lago attacks** which may break application's control flow integrity.
  - ❑ In a nutshell, lago attacks return malicious values instead of valid results.




# Introduction

- ❑ Existing solutions rely on partial re-implementation of OS services, in the form of a **library OS** within the enclave.
- ❑ This does reduce the untrusted OS services to a minimum, but:
  - ❑ Dramatically increases the **Trusted Code Base (TCB)**
  - ❑ Lacks many features available in a regular OS
  - ❑ No ligo attack protection guarantees



# TEEProtect

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# TEESpec

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TEESpec models the OS services as a Labeled Transition System

## ❑ Relations

- ❑ Mapping of abstract keys to an abstract values
- ❑ Allows capturing any number of real-world states

## ❑ Transitions



- ❑ Used to describe system call semantics

```
relation mutex_state(id:int) returns(val:bool);
```

```
action mutex_lock(id: int) returns (res: void) := {  
  extern call untrusted_toyos_lock(id);  
  atomic (mutex_state(id)) {  
    await requires (mutex_state(id).val == UNLOCKED);  
    mutex_state(id).val := LOCKED;  
  };  
};
```

# TEEValidate

- A linkable library. Validates each system call according to TEEspec's specification.




# Results

## TEESpec:


- Formal specification of POSIX Filesystem and synchronization API

## TEEValidate:

- A linkable library that protects TEE apps and library OSes from ligo attacks
- Negligible overhead



(b) FS overheads with SQLite



(c) Futex overheads with Memcached

Thank you!